After an investigation lasting several months, in June 1998 the Federal Trade Commission brought an antitrust lawsuit against Intel Corporation based on Intel's conduct towards Intergraph, and similar conduct towards Digital Equipment Corporation and Compaq, all in the context of disputes where Intel was accused of patent infringement. The FTC charged that Intel's practices were an abuse of Intel's monopoly position in microprocessors. Is Intel's conduct anti-competitive and thus illegal under the antitrust laws? That is the central question explored in this paper. An introductory section provides some background for the case by discussing the tension between intellectual property rights and antitrust law, a tension that is evident in the FTC's dispute with Intel, and by describing the role of patents in the semiconductor industry. Section 3 provides a succinct summary of the facts surrounding Intel's conduct in each of the three patent disputes identified by the FTC. Section 4 explains the FTC's theory of how Intel's conduct was anticompetitive. Section 5 presents Intel's response. Section 6 describes the settlement reached between the FTC and Intel. The final section discusses legal and economic developments since the case was settled and remarks on the lasting implications of the Intel case.
Introduction
When do hardball negotiating tactics constitute violations of the antitrust laws? Consider the following fact pattern, which reflects real-world events during the 1997-1998 time frame:
Intel is the leading manufacturing of high-end microprocessors, the brains of personal computers and workstations. Intergraph Corporation makes computer workstations that use Intel's microprocessors. Intel gives Intergraph, a valued customer, access to Intel's trade secrets (which are very useful when building computers based on Intel's chips) and advance samples of new Intel microprocessors.
Intergraph sues Intel, asserting that Intel's microprocessors infringe on Intergraph's patents. As negotiations fail, the relationship between Intel and Intergraph deteriorates. Intel withdraws the special benefits that Intergraph had been enjoying. Intergraph asserts that Intel has monopoly power over the supply of microprocessors, that Intel's withdrawal of these benefits will greatly damage Intergraph's business, and that Intel's conduct is anti-competitive. Intel claims that its commercial response to Intergraph's lawsuit does not harm competition in any relevant market and that the Courts should not intervene to favor Intergraph in their patent dispute. Is Intel's conduct anti-competitive and thus illegal under the antitrust laws? That is the central question explored in this chapter.
After an investigation lasting several months, in June 1998 the Federal Trade Commission brought an antitrust lawsuit against Intel Corporation based on Intel's conduct towards Intergraph, and similar conduct towards Digital Equipment Corporation and Compaq, all in the context of disputes where Intel was accused of patent infringement. The FTC charged that † The author served as an expert witness of behalf of Intel in the litigation brought by the FTC against Intel, which is the subject of this Chapter. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and should not be attributed in any way to the Intel Corporation.
Intel's practices were an abuse of Intel's monopoly position in microprocessors. 1 The Chairman of the FTC described the FTC's case against Intel as "one of the most widely noted antitrust enforcement actions involving intellectual property." (Pitofsky 2001) The case attracted enormous media attention, in part because it took place contemporaneously with the Justice Department's monopolization case against Microsoft. Commentators asked whether the FTC was heading in a whole new direction with antitrust, since Intel's conduct was directed primarily at its customers rather than at its competitors, the normal (direct) victims in monopolization cases. (Weinstein 1998 (Weinstein , 1999 The FTC and Intel settled their dispute in March 1999, literally on the eve of trial. The FTC's case against Intel, in conjunction with a related private lawsuit described below, helped to define the antitrust limits on what dominant firms can do to gain competitive advantage using their intellectual property.
The next section provides some background for the case by discussing the tension between intellectual property rights and antitrust law, a tension that is evident in the FTC's dispute with Intel, and by describing the role of patents in the semiconductor industry. Section 3 provides a succinct summary of the facts surrounding Intel's conduct in each of the three patent disputes identified by the FTC. Section 4 explains the FTC's theory of how Intel's conduct was anticompetitive. Section 5 presents Intel's response. Section 6 describes the settlement reached between the FTC and Intel. The final section discusses legal and economic developments since the case was settled and remarks on the lasting implications of the Intel case.
The Role of Patents in the Semiconductor Industry
The FTC's case against Intel is first and foremost a case about intellectual property and antitrust: where do intellectual property rights end and antitrust limits begin? Before we turn to the antitrust issues that are central to the Intel case, we must first understand the role of patents, both in general and in the semiconductor industry.
A. The Tension Between Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust
Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets -the primary forms of intellectual property -play an increasingly central role in our economy. Strong or dominant companies increasingly rely on intellectual property rights to earn a return on their R&D investments and to protect their market positions. Under these conditions, the tension that has always existed between intellectual property law -which grants innovators certain rights to exclude others from practicing their inventions -and antitrust law -which seeks to limit monopoly power and to promote competition -has become more visible and more important to our economy. As noted by Shapiro and Varian (1999) , the proper treatment of intellectual property rights under the antitrust laws has become a more pressing and more central policy topic as we move into the "Information Age." Gilbert and Tom (2001) 
B. The Patent Thicket
With this background, we can ask how patents are actually used in the semiconductor industry, the industry in which Intel competes. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) provide a detailed discussion of precisely this issue. 4 They summarize their results as follows:
Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid-1980s. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979-1995. The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned 'patent portfolio races' among capital-intensive firms, but it also facilitated entry by specialized firms. (Hall and Ziedonis, p. 101) The increased patenting activity has created a "patent thicket" in the semiconductor industry.
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The extent of the problem can be seen by looking at some basic data on patenting. Figure #1 shows that the number of U.S. patents issued each year containing the word "microprocessor," "processor," or "CPU" in their abstracts more than doubled during the 1990s to 4714 in the year 1998. Table #1 gives a breakdown for a number of companies in the microprocessor industry.
The cumulative effect: over 25,000 microprocessor patents were issued from 1988 to 1998.
To some extent, this surge in patenting simply reflects the highly innovative nature of the semiconductor industry. For the purposes of the FTC's case against Intel, however, the key point is that the role of patents in the semiconductor industry in the 1990s bore little resemblance to the "classical" role of patents on which the FTC's theory was based. According to the classical, one might say romantic, view of patents, inventors responsible for major inventions rely on the patent system to prevent others from copying their discoveries. While this view fits the pharmaceutical industry reasonably well, patents play a radically different role in the semiconductor industry. To see why, one must first understand three important ways in which patents in our economy today differ from the classical role of patents just described.
First, many companies rely rather little on patents to appropriate the returns from their R&D activities. (Levin, et. al. 1987 , Cohen, et. al. 2000 .) Instead, companies in many industries rely on trade secrets and time-to-market advantages to earn returns on their R&D expenditures.
Second, the propensity to patent (patents issued per dollar of R&D) has risen as more companies engage in defensive patenting. Defensive patenting refers to the practice of seeking patents in order to defend oneself from patent infringement actions brought by others. Under this strategy, the company does not plan to assert its patent proactively against others, but it can counterattack with its own patent infringement claims if sued for infringement (Kortum and Lerner 1998, Hall and Zeidonis 2001) .
Third, there have been increasing concerns about the operation of the patent system itself (Merges 1999) . The general thrust of the criticism is that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has been too generous in granting patent rights. A common criticism is that the PTO lacks sufficient expertise to determine whether many patent applications in fact represent new and useful inventions as required under patent law.
C. Opportunism and "Hold-Up" by Patent Holders
Consider what all this means from the perspective of a successful company like Intel. Each time
Intel designs and produces a new microprocessor, Intel faces some risk that it will be sued for patent infringement. A company suing Intel for patent infringement can be expected to ask the court for an injunction forcing Intel to stop shipping its microprocessors; both Intergraph and Digital sought such injunctions. Once Intel has invested billions of dollars in R&D and in a fabrication facility designed to make its latest chips, the losses Intel would suffer, were it forced to shut down production, would be staggering. In this very real sense, a type of "judo economics" is at work in the industry: the larger are a company's revenues, the more vulnerable is that company to a patent infringement lawsuit, other things equal.
If the classical view of patents applied, this would be a minor problem. Intel would merely refrain from copying patented technology, and it could avoid the risk of a devastating injunction against its flagship products. In the presence of the patent thicket, however, it is much harder for
Intel to avoid this risk. A single microprocessor can potentially infringe on hundreds if not thousands of patents, many of which were not issued, and thus were invisible to Intel, when Intel was designing that microprocessor. Since many companies are working on similar aspects of semiconductor technology in parallel, and since patent applications are secret, it is common for one company to obtain a patent on a process or design element that was simultaneously developed and used by another company. The combination of simultaneous discovery, secrecy of patent applications, lags in the issuing of patents, a patent office that is generous to patent applicants, and the presumption of validity afforded to patents creates a potent mix.
The FTC's economic expert, Professor F.M. Scherer, stressed the danger of hold-up in his testimony at the FTC's Hearings on Global Innovation-Based Competition in 1995:
Smaller firms, and even some rather large firms trying to develop a new product, are essentially finding themselves in a situation just like walking through a mine field: There are lots of unexploded patents out there, and you might just step on one and have your corporate leg blown off…. I find it a rather scary situation, to be honest. See www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC112995.htm.
Clearly, some patent holders will be in a position to engage in opportunistic behavior relative to
Intel. Intel is keenly aware of the dangers of hold-up and attempts to manage those risks, in part by entering into broad cross-licenses with others in the industry, such as IBM. Under these cross-licenses, each company can design and produce its products without fear of infringing on the other's patents. These licenses thus afford "design freedom," but not the freedom to copy.
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The rapid pace of technological advance in the industry in the presence of many such cross licenses attests to their pro-competitive nature. As Hall and Ziedonis (2001) note, semiconductor companies seek patents in large part to be in a better position to negotiate these cross licenses.
While cross-licenses between major players in the industry have proven effective, they are not as well suited to situations where the revenues at risk on the two sides are sharply different. When cross licenses are negotiated, each side makes the case that its patent portfolio is strong and that the other side is earning substantial revenue (and profits) selling products that infringe these patents. When one side has few or no revenues at risk, that party gains an advantage in bargaining. For this reason, patent infringement actions brought by industry outsiders, or by firms with small market shares, can be the most difficult to resolve through cross-licensing.
Texas Instruments is widely seen as having decided to exploit its patents to earn licensing revenues after its business took a turn for the worse (Grindley and Teece, 1997) . The extreme case of this tactic occurs when a firm that holds patents, but engages in no design or manufacturing activities, brings suit against a major industry player. For example, TechSearch sued Intel in 1998 asserting that Intel's Pentium chips infringed patents owned by TechSearch. 
Intel's Conduct During Intellectual Property Disputes
The facts surrounding the episodes giving rise to the FTC's case are relatively simple and for the most part undisputed. 7 For this reason, the FTC's case was largely about the proper legal and economic standard for conduct by a dominant firm, not a messy dispute over the facts, which makes the case especially attractive from the perspective of the antitrust economist.
A. Intergraph Corporation
The basic facts of the Intergraph dispute were described above. Some additional detail is useful, however, to understand better just how the dispute arose between Intergraph and Intel. 
The FTC's Theory
Although some within the FTC felt that Intel's conduct was clearly "unfair," the FTC fashioned a complaint against Intel that contained the standard elements of a Sherman Act monopolization case: monopoly power in a relevant antitrust market combined with anti-competitive conduct to fortify that monopoly.
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A. Intel Had Monopoly Power
Since the FTC's case was based on the claim that Intel's conduct constituted monopolization, the FTC needed first to show that Intel had monopoly power in some well-defined relevant antitrust market. The FTC alleged that Intel had monopoly power in the market for general-purpose microprocessors. This was the essence of the FTC's complaint: that the "natural and probable effect of Intel's conduct" would be to discourage "the industry" from developing "microprocessor-related technologies" and thereby entrench Intel's monopoly power. Notice that the FTC's theory is based on the proposition that "most firms who own or are developing such technologies are vulnerable to retaliation from Intel." This proposition will be tested below.
At the time the FTC issued its complaint against Intel, its press release further articulated the FTC's theory of harm to competition:
Innovation is critical to economic progress, and patents play a crucial role in encouraging that innovation. Intel's great contributions to this country's economic growth have been encouraged and protected by patents in the design and manufacturing processes for its semiconductor products. But if Intel can use its monopoly position in the market for microprocessors to prevent other firms from enforcing their own patents, other firms will have little incentive to invent new features to challenge Intel's dominance. As a monopolist, Intel can compete by producing better, cheaper and more attractive products. It cannot act to cement its monopoly power by preventing other firms from challenging its dominance. Intel has acted illegally. It has used its monopoly power to impede innovation and stifle competition.
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In short, the FTC saw Intel's conduct as a form of expropriation of the patent rights of others through "coercion." If Digital could not protect its innovations from copying by Intel, the FTC argued, Digital would have less incentive to innovate in the future. Similarly, the FTC argued that OEMs such as Compaq and Intergraph might use their own "microprocessor-related" innovations to help sponsor competition by an Intel rival, but such sponsorship would be less attractive if other OEMs using Intel's chips could match these same innovations.
C. Intel's Conduct Had No Efficiency Basis
Under the antitrust laws, even a dominant firm that has acted in a manner that excludes competitors can defend itself by showing that its conduct served a legitimate business purpose.
The FTC asserted that Intel's conduct, in each of the three disputes described above, "was not reasonably necessary to serve any legitimate, procompetitive purpose."
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In fact, the FTC went even further, inferring anti-competitive intent from Intel's actions.
Specifically, the FTC took the view that Intel sacrificed short-term profits by disrupting its relationships with valuable customers, and doing so could only have been profitable because Intel stood to benefit over the longer run by protecting its monopoly. 
Intel's Response to the FTC's Theory
Intel had a radically different view than the FTC on all of these issues.
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A. Competition Faced by Intel
Intel argued that it lacked monopoly power over microprocessors. Intel emphasized two aspects of the microprocessor market. First, the price reductions and performance improvements for microprocessors have been simply extraordinary. Moore's Law, which states that microprocessor performance doubles roughly every 18 months, has been operating for some twenty years. One is hard pressed to find a market where consumers have experienced greater improvements in performance, and reductions in price, over such a sustained period of time.
Intel, a great manufacturer, has continually pushed prices down and introduced dramatically faster and faster chips. Intel questioned whether this is the behavior of a monopolist.
Second, there have been regular price wars and market-share skirmishes between Intel and its most direct rival, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). Here is one rendition from a New York
Times article (Fisher 1999) reporting the price war that broke out between Intel and AMD just one month before the FTC was set to go to trial against Intel:
"Anyone who has watched the semiconductor industry for a while has seen this chain of events play out time and time again. Intel brings out a new generation of microprocessor; Advanced Micro rushes to offer a compatible product but manufacturing glitches keep volume low. Then, when Advanced Micro catches up and is ready to ship increased quantities, Intel cuts prices and prepares for the next generation of products."
In short, Intel argued that it was an aggressive and successful competitor in a market that was generating enormous benefits to consumers.
Although Intel disputed the FTC's assertion that Intel had monopoly power in the market for general-purpose microprocessors, the analysis below of Intel's conduct assumes that Intel indeed had such power. 14 In the context of the disputes described above, this assumption implies that Intel believed that its policy of "IP for IP" was a natural -and legal -way to use its valuable intellectual property to gain design freedom so that it could make the very best chips, to reduce its payments of royalties, and to limit its exposure to hold-up. While far from perfect as a defense -Intel was still at a strategic disadvantage by virtue of its enormous microprocessor revenues -this policy helped Intel be a more effective competitor without involving the offensive use of Intel's patents. In other words, Intel saw its policy of "IP for IP" as appropriate in the context of the wave of defensive patenting, and in the presence of the patent thicket in its industry. Intel's documents and the testimony of Intel's executives consistently supported this view that Intel's policy of "IP for IP" was a defensive strategy to deal with the patent thicket and not designed to deter other industry members from engaging in innovation.
In contrast, the FTC's position was that Intel had no legitimate business justification for its actions. As noted above, the FTC took the position that Intel had previously benefited from offering technical assistance and confidential information to Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital, so
Intel's decision to restrict or reduce the supply of confidential information and technical support to these companies was unjustified.
From Intel's perspective, this aggressive strategy directed against its customers made sense because its objective was the preservation of its monopoly, and it was willing to reduce its short-run profits to do so." Complaint Counsels' Pretrial Brief, p.2
By terminating Intergraph's, Digital's, and Compaq's access to product information and samples, Intel gave up the benefits it obtained from the cooperative relationship it had previously enjoyed with each company. ... Aspen teaches that the sacrifice of short term benefits is evidence of anticompetitive purpose and nature. Complaint Counsels' Pretrial Brief, pp. 46-47.
The central economic issue here is not especially complex. Let us suppose that Intel's tactics had the purpose and effect of allowing Intel to negotiate more favorable terms for cross-licenses with Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital than Intel could have obtained had it continued to provide its trade secrets and advance product samples to those companies. In other words, suppose that
Intel's tactics allowed Intel lower its royalty costs and perhaps improve the quality of its chips (by achieving greater design freedom). Are these "legitimate business justifications"?
The ability to achieve lower costs and improved product quality are the essence of "competition on the merits." Intel's efforts to reduce its royalty costs and to achieve greater design freedom by bargaining using its own intellectual property should at the very least count as a procompetitive benefits, against which any anti-competitive effects should be balanced. In short, there is no economic basis for the FTC's position that Intel's attempt to lower its costs and to obtain design freedom somehow do not count as a "legitimate business" objective.
This conclusion is strengthened once one recognizes the perils facing Intel, and others, who are vulnerable to hold-up as a result of the patent thicket. Recall that both Intergraph and Digital sought injunctive relief to enjoin Intel from selling its flagship microprocessor products, while
Compaq sought to enjoin Intel's sales of motherboards. As noted above, once Intel has sunk substantial costs in the design and production of its microprocessors, Intel may be subject to hold-up by patent holders whose actual contributions fall far short of the royalties they can extract from Intel. In fact, Intergraph fit the hold-up pattern quite well: Intergraph had already exited the microprocessor business and was trying to mine older patents. The Digital situation also fit the hold-up pattern: Digital's Alpha microprocessor had not been selling well, Digital appeared to be seeking a graceful exit strategy, and Digital in fact gained considerable financial benefits from its settlement with Intel, as described above. 
C. The Effect of Intel's Conduct on Microprocessor Competition
Intel also hotly disputed the FTC's claim that Intel's conduct had harmed competition in the microprocessor market.
The FTC asserted that "Intel's conduct preserved its monopoly by guaranteeing Intel's access to innovative technology." (Complaint Counsels' Pretrial Brief, p. 42) In other words, by insuring that it could offer the most advanced microprocessors, the FTC stated that Intel's monopoly position would be preserved. This notion -that it is anti-competitive for a monopolist to use its monopoly power to negotiate for better or cheaper inputs and thus to improve its product -is misguided. True, such cost reductions and product improvements will make it harder for others to topple the monopoly; but lower costs and higher quality are the essence of competition and should be encouraged. Exchanging one's own intellectual property to lower royalty costs and to help gain the necessary IP rights to make improvements is therefore also pro-competitive.
The FTC also asserted that "Deterring innovation was another means for Intel to preserve its monopoly." "The evidence will show that the ability of Intel to force licenses to the technology it desires will, over time, dull the incentive of other firms to innovate." (Complaint Counsels' Pretrial Brief, 16 Recall that the analysis here assumes that Intel has monopoly power. Therefore, this list of rivals is best thought of as the list of firms that are best placed to engage in innovation that will erode Intel's monopoly power.
Despite this formidable obstacle, the FTC attempted to prove that Intel's conduct "chilled" innovation activity. But the evidence obtained during the discovery process simply did not support the "chill" theory. One after another, the major innovators in the microprocessor field, The FTC was forced to take the position that the harm to innovation would take place gradually, and could simply not be detected yet, despite the fact that Intel had been following its policy of IP for IP for some time. As stated by the FTC's economic expert, the consequences of Intel's actions would "unravel over a period of probably ten or so years, and it's just too early to assess those consequences." (Intel's Trial Brief, p. 29)
Settlement and Consent Order
Under the FTC's procedures, the FTC action against Intel went before an administrative law The beauty of this compromise was that it met the essential needs of both the FTC and of Intel.
In particular, the FTC obtained some protections for customers suing Intel for patent infringement, under the theory that customers' ability to bring such lawsuits would serve to encourage their innovative efforts. From Intel's perspective, the settlement ended the FTC case against Intel and allowed Intel to bring its own intellectual property rights to bear in negotiations if the other party were seeking an injunction against Intel's microprocessors, the very type of hold-up that was of greatest concern to Intel. Both the FTC and Intel expressed satisfaction with the result, although Intel continued to assert that its conduct had not violated the antitrust laws.
Subsequent Developments
Although it settled with the FTC, Intel's litigation with Intergraph continued. Recall that Intergraph had obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Intel to continue to provide it with trade secrets and advance samples. Intel had appealed this injunction to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the appeals court that specializes in intellectual property disputes.
In a major decision issued in November 1999, the CAFC ruled strongly in Intel's favor. 22 The
Court strongly supported Intel's view of its rights as a holder of intellectual property and of the limitations of Intergraph's antitrust case against Intel. In particular, the CAFC emphasized that
Intergraph was not a competitor to Intel in the market in which Intel was alleged to have a monopoly, namely the microprocessor market. Citing substantial precedent, and relying on the fact that Intergraph and Intel were in a customer/supplier relationship, not a competitive relationship, the CAFC could find no likelihood that Intel's conduct, even if it harmed Intergraph, violated the Sherman Act. 23 Here are three key quotes from the CAFC decision:
However, the Sherman Act does not convert all harsh commercial actions into antitrust violations. Unilateral conduct that may adversely affect another's business situation, but is not intended to monopolize that business, does not violate the Sherman Act…. Intel's conduct with respect to Intergraph does not constitute the offense of monopolization or the threat thereof in any market relevant to competition with Intergraph.
Intergraph provided no support for its charge that Intel's action in withholding "strategic customer" benefits from Intergraph was for the purpose of enhancing Intel's competitive position. … No threat or actual monopolization is asserted to flow from the various rejected patent license proposals. Commercial negotiations to trade patent property rights for other consideration in order to settle a patent dispute is neither tying nor coercive reciprocity in violation of the Sherman Act. Although the district court calls Intel's actions "hardball," it is not the judicial role to readjust the risks in high-stakes commercial dealings.
Despite the district court's sensitive concern for Intergraph's well-being while it conducts its patent suit against Intel, there must be an adverse effect on competition in order to bring an antitrust remedy to bear. The remedy of compulsory disclosure of proprietary information and provision of pre-production chips and other commercial and intellectual property is a dramatic remedy for antitrust illegality, and requires violation of antitrust law or the likelihood that such violation would be established. In the proceedings whose record is before us, Intergraph has not shown a substantial likelihood of success in establishing that Intel violated the antitrust laws in its actions with respect to Intergraph, or that Intel agreed by contract to provide the benefits contained in the injunction.
Intel's perspective also has gained ground at the Federal Trade Commission itself. 24 Muris explicitly identifies concerns about hold-up as an area where the FTC is "wrong on the facts." "In rejecting suits by Intel's customers as a justification for Intel's refusal to supply information, the FTC appears to have ignored the implication of the relational contracts literature discussed [above.]" (Muris 2000, p. 717) 
